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ABSTRACT
Separating benign domains from domains generated by DGAs with
the help of a binary classifier is a well-studied problem for which
promising performance results have been published. The corre-
sponding multiclass task of determining the exact DGA that gener-
ated a domain enabling targeted remediation measures is less well
studied. Selecting the most promising classifier for these tasks in
practice raises a number of questions that have not been addressed
in prior work so far. These include the questions on which traffic to
train in which network and when, just as well as how to assess ro-
bustness against adversarial attacks. Moreover, it is unclear which
features lead a classifier to a decision and whether the classifiers
are real-time capable. In this paper, we address these issues and
thus contribute to bringing DGA detection classifiers closer to prac-
tical use. In this context, we propose one novel classifier based on
residual neural networks for each of the two tasks and extensively
evaluate them as well as previously proposed classifiers in a unified
setting. We not only evaluate their classification performance but
also compare them with respect to explainability, robustness, and
training and classification speed. Finally, we show that our newly
proposed binary classifier generalizes well to other networks, is
time-robust, and able to identify previously unknown DGAs.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Intrusion detection systems;Malware and
its mitigation; • Computing methodologies→ Machine learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bots need to be able to establish a connection to their command
and control (C2) server in order to obtain updates or commands. To
this end, they often rely on domain generation algorithms (DGAs),
which generate a large amount of pseudo-random domain names
using a seed. The botnet herder knows the seed and is thus able to
predict the algorithmically generated domains (AGDs) in advance
and to register a small subset of these domains. The bots query the
AGDs one-by-one trying to obtain a valid IP address for the C2
server. The majority of these queries result in non-existent domain
(NXD) responses. Only the domain names that are registered by the
botnet herder successfully resolve to valid IP addresses and thus to
a successful contact between the bot and the C2 server.
To detect the activity of DGA-based malware, various binary
machine learning classifiers have been proposed that label domain
names contained in DNS queries as benign or malicious. These
include classical feature-based approaches such as random forests
(RFs) or support vector machines (SVMs) (e.g., [20]), as well as
featureless classifiers, such as recurrent (RNNs) or convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) (e.g., [18, 28, 30]). The classification per-
formance reported for these binary classifiers is so promising that
it seems high time to bring these classifiers into practice.
While binary classification allows to detect infections with DGA-
based malware in a network, multiclass classification additionally
allows for attributing an AGD to a specific malware family. This
ultimately makes it possible to trigger appropriate remediation
measures. The multiclass task is far less well studied and has proven
to be more challenging than the binary task (e.g., [23, 26, 28]).
Choosing among the available approaches and tuning them for
real-world usage raises a number of questions, starting with which
one of the various proposed classifiers to use for each task. Tak-
ing a closer look at previous publications shows that the proposed
classifiers are currently hard to compare as there is barely any com-
parative evaluation of their performance, especially not in a unified
setting based on the same real-world data. Thus, it is currently hard
to assess the classification performance and training and classifica-
tion speed of the various classifiers, let alone compare what these
classifiers learn and how robust they are against evasion with the
help of adversarial examples. Bringing them closer to practice also
requires addressing the question in which network to train, which
traffic to use, and how often to train.
In this paper, we address these issues and thus further pave
the way for a smooth adoption of DGA classifiers in practice. In
particular, we make the following contributions:
First, we propose two classifiers for DGA detection based on
residual neural networks (ResNets), one for binary and one for
multiclass classification. Our classifiers operate on domain names
alone and do not need any additional contextual information. We
focus on domain names extracted from non-resolving DNS traffic
(NX-traffic), which has several advantages in practice. Foremost,
the activity of a DGA is typically recognizable in the NX-traffic
well before one of the AGDs successfully resolves. Thus, a bot’s
activity can be detected even before it is commanded to partake
in any malicious action. In addition, the amount of non-resolving
DNS traffic is an order of magnitude smaller than the amount of
full DNS traffic and thus easier to monitor.
Second, we specify a unified setting to comprehensively compare
our proposed classifiers with the best feature-based approach and
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the previously proposed types of featureless classifiers. To guaran-
tee a fair comparison we evaluate all classifiers on the same real-
world NX-traffic in combination with malicious data obtained from
DGArchive[16] using the same unified input data pre-processing.
For the binary classification task, we show that our classifier per-
forms at least comparable to the best state-of-the-art approaches,
has a very low false positive rate, and clearly exceeds the other
classifiers in the extraction of complex features. For the multiclass
classification task, our ResNet-based classifier outperforms prior
work in attributing AGDs to DGAs accomplishing an improvement
of over 5% in f1-score while requiring 30% less training time com-
pared to the next best classifier.
Third, we study how the classifiers perform with respect to
explainability, robustness, generalizability, and training and classi-
fication speed. In particular, we show that the ResNet-based binary
classifier generalizes well to new environments, performs stable
over time, is capable of performing live detection within large net-
works, is robust against two recently proposed adversarial attacks,
and able to detect new DGAs as well as new seeds of known DGAs
in a real-world test.
2 RELATEDWORK
Various approaches have been proposed to detect DGA activities
within networks. In [8] meta information of transmitted network
packets are statistically analyzed to detect DGA malware infected
devices. Others use filtering and clustering techniques to identify C2
servers (e.g., [19, 29]). Many works make use of machine learning
classifiers, such as extreme learning machines, SVMs, or different
types of Decision Tree algorithms, in combination with manual fea-
ture engineering to classify domain names as benign or malicious
(e.g.,[4, 20, 21]). In [2] a system is proposed which uses clustering
combined with a hidden Markov Model to determine the likelihood
that a domain is an AGD generated by a certain DGA. All of these
approaches but [20] rely on extensive tracking of DNS traffic for
classification. As such, they are more intrusive and resource in-
tensive than approaches performing classification on information
extracted from a single domain.
In this latter category, different types of deep learning based
classifiers (RNNs or CNNs) have been proposed for the DGA bi-
nary (e.g., [18, 28, 30]) and the DGA multiclass classification task
(e.g.,[23, 26, 28]). The advantage of the deep learning based ap-
proaches is that they do not require the extensive feature engineer-
ing, which is necessary for the classical ones. Different comparison
papers (e.g.,[23, 25, 30]) show that the deep learning classifiers
outperform the classical approaches. However, the feature-based
classifiers which are used as a baseline in these works are often
developed with little effort or a certain input pre-processing is used
which renders several features of state-of-the-art feature-based
approaches useless. Thus, related work falls somewhat short of pro-
viding a fair comparison of these two types of approaches. Moreover,
all prior deep learning based classifiers are evaluated on full DNS
traffic or on its resolving part rather than on NX-traffic. Often, even
artificial data sets are used relying on website popularity rankings
such as Alexa [11] for benign ground truth data. A recent study
[13] shows that such website popularity rankings are easy to ma-
nipulate. An adversary could inject arbitrary malicious domain
names in such lists with only little effort making these data sources
untrustworthy. In our work, we overcome these shortcomings by
providing a fair comparison of a state-of-the-art feature-based ap-
proach and several deep learning based approaches, including our
new ResNet-based classifiers, using the same real-world NX-traffic
data for all experiments and classifiers.
The deep learning classifier for the multiclass task proposed in
[28] is prone to class imbalances. As shown in [32] multiclass clas-
sification does not benefit from common approaches such as over-
or undersampling. Rather, these techniques can have a negative
impact on the performance of a classifier. An approach to overcome
this problem is proposed in [26] and involves making the classifier
cost-sensitive. Thereby, the authors are able to greatly increase the
detection rate of DGAs which are less represented in the training
data.
Recently, some of the DGA classifiers have been shown to be
vulnerable to adversarial examples which are worst-case perturba-
tions of input data causing a classifier to misclassify such samples
(e.g. [1, 15, 22, 25]). In [25] the samples are generated by exploit-
ing known features of a feature-based classifier. In [15] they are
created by slightly perturbing Alexa top domain names, exploiting
the fact that many of the classifiers are trained using resolving
DNS traffic. In [1] a generative adversarial network is leveraged to
generate adversarial samples. Finally, in [22] perturbation is added
to an AGD of a known DGA based on the computed Jacobian-based
Saliency Map for a specific input sample. The effectiveness of the
adversarial samples generated by these strategies have so far only
been evaluated against classifiers trained on resolving DNS traffic.
We show that, when trained on NX-traffic, the classifiers are more
robust and correctly classify the adversarial samples generated by
the strategies described in [15, 25].
3 UNIFIED INPUT PROCESSING & RESNET
In this section, we propose two different versions of ResNet-based
classifiers, B-ResNet for DGA binary classification andM-ResNet for
DGA multiclass classification. Alongside, we introduce the unified
input processing we use to comparatively assess the performance of
the various available classifiers. ResNets [9, 10] have achieved great
results in the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
(ILSVRC)[17]. They are built up of stacked residual building blocks,
which introduce skip connections allowing the gradient to bypass
layers in unchanged form during training. The effectiveness of
ResNets is caused by the skip connections making them behave
like ensembles of relatively shallow neural network classifiers [27].
Hence, making ResNets deeper correlates to the effect of increasing
the number of shallow networks of an ensemble classifier. Our
binary classification task is less complex and a shallow network is
already sufficient to achieve accuracies comparable to other state-of-
the-art approaches. However, for the more challenging multiclass
classification task, the network we propose is deeper and able to
achieve an improvement of more than 5% in f1-score compared to
the best state-of-the-art approach.
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Figure 1: (a) B-ResNet network architecturewith insight into
a single residual block used for binary classification. (b) M-
ResNet architecture used for the multiclass classification.
3.1 Unified Input Pre-Processing
To enable a fair comparison of the ResNet-based classifiers with
other featureless classifiers, we need to unify the input pre-process-
ing. Hence, before we handover the NXDs to any of the featureless
classifiers we perform a pre-processing step in which we convert all
characters to lowercase and map every valid character to a unique
integer. Additionally, we pad the input with zeros from the left side
to the maximum domain length of 253 characters [14] to be able to
perform training and classification on every possible NXD while
using batch learning. In contrast to other works (e.g. [25, 28]), we do
not remove the top-level domain (TLD) or any labels which extend
past the second level domain. This information is crucial for a fair
comparison with the currently best feature-based approach [20] as
many of its features depend on it. Note that experiments in which
we discard the TLD or labels past the second level showed a loss in
accuracy also for the deep learning based approaches.
3.2 B-ResNet
The network architecture for B-ResNet and the internals of one
residual building block are depicted in Fig.1(a). B-ResNet starts
processing the input data using an embedding layer, which incor-
porates additional information about the relations between single
characters into the encoding of a domain name. This is achieved by
projecting similar characters to similar vectors where the under-
standing of similarity is learned automatically based on the training
data. Thereby, the embedding layer learns a 128-dimensional vector
representation for every valid character. Consequently, every NXD
which is handed over to the classifier is projected by the embedding
layer into a sequence of 128-dimensional vectors of length 253. The
weights of the embedding layer are jointly optimized with all other
weights of the neural network during training. For binary classifica-
tion, we use a single residual block. The input to the residual block
passes two convolutional layers where in between the rectified
linear unit (ReLU) non-linearity function is applied to the outcome
of the first convolutional layer. Additionally, the unchanged input
is added to the outcome of the second convolutional layer. The
residual block is specified by two variables which determine the
parameters of the two convolutional layers. The first one is the
kernel size k and the second parameter f specifies the number of
filters within the convolutional layers. For binary classification, k
is set to 4 and f to 128. Additionally, we use ReLU on the output
of the residual block and perform max pooling with a pooling size
of 4. Lastly, the final output layer, consisting of a single node with
sigmoid activation, performs the logistic regression for the binary
classification. For training the classifier, we use the binary cross-
entropy as loss function and Adam[12] as optimization algorithm
with a batch size of 128.
3.3 M-ResNet
The architecture of our M-ResNet model is depicted in Fig.1(b). We
use eleven residual blocks where the first two use a kernel size of
4 and 3, respectively. All other residual blocks are set to a kernel
size of 2. We use an embedding layer with the same output size as
B-ResNet but increase the number of filters of the residual blocks
to 256. Due to this change we need to increase the dimension of the
input to the first residual block in order to be able to perform the
addition operation. This is done by using an additional convolution
with k = 1 and f = 256 before summing up the input to the out-
come of the other branch. During our studies we experimented with
different depths and obtained best results for classifiers with eleven
to 14 residual blocks. We chose to further evaluate the classifier
with eleven residual blocks since it requires significantly less train-
ing time than the ones with more blocks. Extending the network
architecture with more than 14 residual blocks did not improve the
performance of the classifier. After each residual block we apply
ReLU and perform max pooling with a pooling size of 2 until the
input data dimension reduces to one single vector. Before the final
layer, we do not apply ReLU on the output of the last residual block.
In contrast to the binary classification, the final output layer is now
composed of as many nodes as classes are present. Here, it performs
a multinomial logistic regression by using the softmax activation
function. For training, the categorical cross-entropy is used to com-
pute the loss and Adam is used as optimization algorithm with a
batch size of 256.
In order to cope with class imbalances, limiting the detection
rate of DGAs for which only a small number of training samples
exist, we apply class weighting as proposed by Tran et al. [26]. Here,
we introduce a class weight Ci for every class i which influences
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the magnitude of the weight updates during the training phase by
weighting the loss function. Falsely classified samples of class i are
now penalized with Ci instead of 1. Therefore, the higher Ci the
more the model emphasizes on class i . The class weights Ci are
defined as follows:
Ci =
( total number o f samples
number o f samples in class i
)γ
The parameter γ denotes how much the data set should be rebal-
anced. Setting γ = 1 forces the model to treat every class equally
regardless of the number of samples per class included in the train-
ing data. If γ = 0 is chosen, no rebalancing is applied. Similar to
Tran et al. we propose to set γ = 0.3.
4 EVALUATION SETUP & OVERVIEW
In this section, we specify the unified setup we use in all of our
comparative evaluations including the selected baseline classifiers,
the data sources we used, as well as the tools and metrics applied.
In addition, we motivate the experiments we conducted to address
the identified open questions when bringing DGA classifiers into
practice.
4.1 Selected State-of-the-Art Classifiers
We first recap the currently best feature-based approach FANCI [20]
and then continue with one candidate each for each of the two
neural network types (RNN and CNN).
4.1.1 Feature-based Approach: FANCI. FANCI [20] implements an
RF and an SVM classifier to separate benign from malicious NXDs.
In this paper, we focus on the RF classifier since it slightly out-
performs the SVM approach. FANCI’s classification relies on 21
hand-crafted features which can be divided into three different cat-
egories: structural, linguistic, and statistical features. The publicly
accessible implementation of FANCI does not support multiclass
classification off-the-shelf. While the multiclass task can easily be
transformed to multiple binary classification tasks (e.g., by using
multiple one-vs.-one or one-vs.-all binary classifiers), we chose
not to implement multiclass classification support for FANCI. The
rational is that the features used in FANCI are specifically crafted
to distinguish between benign and malicious NXDs and not to
distinguish between NXDs generated by different DGAs. Thus, ex-
tending FANCI to a promising multiclass classifier would require
the crafting of new features which is a time-consuming task.
4.1.2 Featureless Approaches. All featureless approaches use the
same input pre-processing as described in Section 3.1, and the input
embedding described in Section 3.2. In the following, we denote
classifiers which separate benign from malicious NXDs with a
leading B and classifiers which solve the multiclass classification
task with a leading M. Additionally, we differentiate between cost-
sensitive and cost-insensitive models. In our experiments for the
binary task, we do not evaluate cost-sensitive models since the
sample distribution of the used data sets is balanced and thus the
performance would not deviate from the models without class
weighting. For all multiclass experiments involving cost-sensitive
models (ending with .MI ), we set γ = 0.3.
B-Endgame, M-Endgame &M-Endgame.MI. Woodbridge et
al. [28] propose a binary and a multiclass DGA classifier which
process the embedded input data with a long short-term memory
(LSTM) layer containing 128 hidden units with hyperbolic tangent
activation. For our evaluation, we optimized the proposed models
by interchanging the standard LSTM implementation of Keras [6]
with the faster CuDNN [5] implementation, that runs on graph-
ics processing units (GPUs). We denote the resulting classifiers
by B-Endgame and M-Endgame. Thereby, we can guarantee a fair
comparison of training and classification speeds because the other
deep learning models also take advantage of GPU processing. We
performed several experiments which ensured that this modifica-
tion has no impact on the classification performance. Further, we
denote the cost-sensitive model proposed by Tran et al. [26] by
M-Endgame.MI.
B-NYU, M-NYU & M-NYU.MI. Yu et al. [30] propose a model
based on two 1-dimensional CNN layers with 128 filters for the
DGA binary classification task. We adapted the binary classifier
B-NYU to a multiclass classifier M-NYU and a cost-sensitive variant
M-NYU.MI using a similar approach as in M-ResNet (Section 3.3).
4.2 Data Sets
We use the domain names of NX-traffic from two distinct networks
as sources for benign data and one source for malicious domain
names generated by DGAs.
DGArchive. Our source for malicious domains is DGArchive
[16], which uses reimplementations of reverse engineered DGAs
and known seeds to produce AGDs. DGArchive contains approxi-
mately 93 million unique AGDs which are produced by 88 different
DGA families at the time of writing.
University Network. We obtain benign data from the central
DNS resolver of the campus network of RWTH Aachen Univer-
sity, which includes several academic and administrative networks,
networks from student residences, eduroam [7], and the network
of the university hospital of RWTH Aachen. From this source, we
obtained two one-month recordings of benign NXDs. The first
recording is composed of NXDs from mid-May 2017 until mid-June
2017. The second recording includes NXDs from mid-October 2017
until mid-November 2017. Each of the recordings contains around
35 million unique NXD responses.
Company Network. The second source for benign data are
several central DNS resolvers of Siemens AG1, which cover the re-
gions of Asia, Europe, and the USA. From the company, we in total
obtained three one-month recordings of benign NXDs. More pre-
cisely, the recordings are from Oct. 2017, Feb. 2019, and Apr. 2019,
and contain approximately 20 million, 22 million, and 27 million
unique NXDs, respectively.
These data sources provide us with diverse data of different times
of days and different days of a week including working and non-
working days. Therefore, these recordings allow for the creation
of representative real-world data sets. Primarily, the benign non-
resolving domain names originate from typing errors caused by
1https://www.siemens.com
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Table 1: Evaluation Metrics
ACC = T P+T NT P+T N+F P+FN Precision =
T P
T P+F P
Recall = T PT P+FN F1−score = 2 · Precision ·RecallPrecision+Recall
humans, faulty or outdated software trying to resolve domains that
do not exist, or by the intentional misuse of the DNS for different
purposes. To further clean our benign sets, we filter all university
and company recordings against DGArchive and remove all known
malicious AGDs from the benign labeled data. However, benign
AGDs, such as domains generated by the DGA included in Google
Chrome used for DNS hijacking detection [31], or domains gener-
ated by antivirus software for signature checks [24], remain and
are accounted as benign.
4.3 Experimental Overview & Metrics
All deep learning based classifiers are evaluated on an NVIDIA
Tesla V100 GPU using Python 3.6.0, Keras 2.24, TensorFlow 1.13.1,
CUDA 10.0.130, and cuDNN 7.4.
We divide our evaluation of the classifiers into two parts. In the
first part (Section 5), we evaluate the classification performance of
the classifiers. In the second part (Section 6), we compare the clas-
sifiers with respect to the explainability of their predictions, their
robustness against two adversarial attacks and their training and
classification speed. In addition, we evaluate B-ResNet’s generaliz-
ability with respect to changes in time and network environment.
The evaluation of the classification performance of the classifiers
is further divided into the following three parts:
In Section 5.1, we assess the performance of the binary classifiers.
We start with what we refer to as the mixed DGAs setting in which
we assess the classifiers’ ability to correctly classify AGDs of known
DGAs. I.e., we train the classifiers on samples of known DGAs and
evaluate the performance on different samples generated by the
same DGAs.
In a second binary classification experiment, we test the capa-
bility of the classifiers to detect AGDs of unknown DGAs. Here,
we evaluate the detection rate on AGDs which are generated by a
DGA for which no samples were included in the training set.
In both experiments, the accuracy (ACC) is used as primary
metric to measure the performance of the classifiers. The ACC is
computed from the total number of true positivesTP , true negatives
TN , false negatives FN , and false positives FP as shown in Table 1.
As additional metrics, we provide the true positive rate (TPR), true
negative rate (TNR), false negative rate (FNR), and the false positive
rate (FPR).
In Section 5.2, the performance of the multiclass classifiers are
compared. Here, we assess the performance of the classifiers by the
f1-score, recall, and precision. The formulas for the calculation of
these metrics are included in Table 1. For computing the overall
evaluationmetrics we chosemacro-averaging over micro-averaging
as we want to analyze the effect of class imbalance on different
classifiers. The former averages the evaluation metrics over all
classes regardless of the number of samples per class inside the
test set, giving each class the same level of importance. The latter
Table 2: Binary Classification: Mixed DGAs
Classifier ACC TPR TNR FNR FPR
FANCI 0.99764 0.99744 0.99784 0.00256 0.00216
B-Endgame 0.99891 0.99969 0.99813 0.00031 0.00187
B-NYU 0.99907 0.99976 0.99838 0.00024 0.00162
B-ResNet 0.99916 0.99978 0.99853 0.00022 0.00147
accounts each sample an equal level of importance making the
overall score biased towards well-represented classes.
5 CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE
This section is dedicated to the comparative evaluation of the classi-
fication performance of the various binary and multiclass classifiers,
including the detection of unknown DGAs.
5.1 Binary Classification
Since we strive for a fair comparison of deep learning approaches
with a classical feature-based classifier, we first reproduce the orig-
inal paper results of FANCI and in the second step we evaluate the
deep learning classifiers on the same data. For the binary evaluation,
we use 20 data sets with a set size of 92,102 samples which con-
tain as many benign samples as malicious samples. The malicious
samples are uniformly distributed among all DGAs included in the
data sets of [20]. All samples are drawn uniformly at random from
the one-month May/June recording of the university benign source
and from the DGArchive data for malicious samples.
5.1.1 Mixed DGAs. We investigate the capability of the classifiers
to detect AGDs of known DGAs by performing 5 repetitions of
a 5-fold cross validation on the 20 previously described data sets.
Accordingly, for each fold we split the data sets into 80% training
and 20% testing samples. Additionally, we remove 5% of the training
data for a holdout set, which is used to validate the performance
of the deep learning classifiers during training. We train the deep
learning models until there are no further improvement on the
holdout set.
The averaged results for the different classifiers are depicted in
Table 2. Each classifier offers an excellent detection rate. FANCI
achieves a similar performance as stated in [20]. However, all deep
learning based classifiers perform slightly better than FANCI. The
FNR even decreases by one order of magnitude compared to FANCI.
Regarding the achieved accuracy, our B-ResNet classifier performs
at least comparable to if not better than the other deep learning
classifiers and shows the smallest FPR.
5.1.2 Unknown DGAs. Here, we evaluate the capability of the clas-
sifiers to detect AGDs of unknown DGAs. To this end, we perform 5
repetitions of a leave-one-group-out cross validation for each of the
20 data sets. We train the classifiers on samples of all DGAs but one,
and evaluate the performance on the AGDs of the left out DGA.
The averaged results are depicted in Table 3. All classifiers are
highly capable of detecting unknown DGAs. All deep learning ap-
proaches perform slightly better than FANCI but among themselves
they perform approximately equally well.
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Table 3: Binary Classification: Unknown DGAs
Classifier ACC TPR TNR FNR FPR
FANCI 0.98073 0.96392 0.99754 0.03608 0.00246
B-Endgame 0.98569 0.97307 0.99830 0.02693 0.00170
B-NYU 0.98406 0.96961 0.99851 0.03039 0.00149
B-ResNet 0.98517 0.97168 0.99866 0.02832 0.00134
Table 4: Multiclass Classification
Classifier F1-score Precision Recall
M-Endgame 0.72541 0.74319 0.72567
M-Endgame.MI 0.74312 0.76022 0.74499
M-NYU 0.68913 0.71867 0.68738
M-NYU.MI 0.73832 0.76104 0.73993
M-ResNet 0.78878 0.81734 0.78850
M-ResNet.MI 0.79648 0.81266 0.80306
5.2 Multiclass Classification
In this section, we compare the performance of the classifiers ac-
cording to the multiclass classification task. Here, we measure the
ability of the classifiers to correctly label a sample either as benign,
or in the case of an AGD, with the corresponding DGA family which
generated the domain name.
To this end, we create a data set which contains 10,000 random
samples for each DGA in DGArchive for which at least this many
samples exist and all samples of DGAs for which less than 10,000
samples are known. Additionally, we include 10,000 random sam-
ples of the Apr. 2019 recording of the company benign data source.
This results in 89 classes including the benign class and yields an
overall set size of 526,534 samples.
For evaluation, we perform 5 repetitions of a 5-fold cross vali-
dation where we split the samples of each included class into 80%
training and 20% testing samples in every fold.
Table 4 shows the averaged results for the different classifiers.
The cost-sensitive approaches always perform better than their cost-
insensitive counterpart. The M-NYU model profits most while the
improvements of M-ResNet are minor. M-ResNet.MI outperforms
every other model and achieves an f1-score which is more than
5 percentage points above the next best state-of-the-art classifier.
Recall that we use macro-averaging for computing the overall f1-
score. An improvement of 5% means that our classifier is able to
correctly classify AGDs of several classes which the other classifiers
are not able to correctly attribute. For example, for the 7 classes
for which we observe the largest difference in f1-scores between
M-ResNet.MI and M-Endgame.MI, the former achieves an averaged
f1-score of 0.80322 and the latter one of 0.19917. On average, for
each of theses DGAs only 40 samples are available for training,
indicating that ResNets perform particularly well in the extraction
of features from smaller amounts of samples.
To visualize the classification performance of M-ResNet.MI we
additionally provide the corresponding confusion matrix in Fig. 2.
The blocks inside the figure depict the fraction of samples of the
classes on the vertical axis which are labeled as classes on the
horizontal axis. 100% is represented by a clear black block and 0% is
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Figure 2: Confusion matrix of M-ResNet.MI.
represented as a clear white block. A perfect classifier would yield
an identity matrix of black blocks. It can be seen that the benign
class (located in the top-left corner) can be precisely separated from
all other classes (f1-score of 0.99684). Most DGA families are easily
recognizable. The most striking outlier is Dnsbenchmark. 100% of
its test samples are labeled as Gameover. This is due to the small
amount of available AGDs for this DGA. The training set includes
only 4 samples and the classification score for the whole class
relies on the classification of one single sample. Hence, when this
single sample is labeled incorrectly, the f1-score of the whole class
degrades to zero in the corresponding fold. The same applies to the
Randomloader class, which also contains only 5 samples. However,
here, the classifier is able to label some of its AGDs correctly. In
general, DGA families which are related to each other such as
Pykspa2 and Pykspa2s generate similar AGDs. Therefore, it is hard
for the classifier to separate these classes among themselves but it
is still able to delimit them from all other classes.
6 CLASSIFIER PROPERTIES
We compare the classifiers according to the explainability of their
classification results, their robustness against two evasion strategies,
and their training and classification speed. We also evaluate how
well B-ResNet generalizes to different network environments and
with respect to time.
6.1 Explainability
While the predictions of feature-based approaches such as FANCI
can be traced down to the individual features of AGDs, this is not
possible for the deep learning based classifiers. Therefore, in this
section, we strive to explain the predictions of these approaches
by investigating the falsely attributed AGDs from the multiclass
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Table 5: Regular Expressions for Several DGAs Grouped by
Similarity
DGA #Training Samples AGD Regex
bedep 5966 [a-z0-9]{12,18}.com
dircrypt 552 [a-z]{8,20}.com
dnschanger 8000 [a-z]{10}.com
goznym 291 [a-z]{5,12}.com
hesperbot 142 [a-z]{8,24}.com
ramnit 8000 [a-y]{8,19}.(bid|click|com|eu)
feodo 153 ([a-z]{16}|[a-z]{18}).ru
blackhole 585 [a-z]{16}.ru
oderoor 8000 [a-z]{7,12}.(cc|com|dyndns.org|net|tv)
vidro 8000 [a-z]{7,12}.(com|dyndns.org|net)
classification experiment (Section 5.2). To highlight some of the self-
learned features used by the deep learning classifiers, we extract
simple regular expressions for each DGA and check it against all
samples of this DGA included in DGArchive.
Table 5 shows an excerpt of these expressions grouped by similar-
ity including the number of training samples per DGA. For instance,
the regular expression for Ramnit is [a-y]{8,19}.(bid|click|com|eu).
I.e., this DGA generates strings of length 8 to 19 using only char-
acters from a to y and then appends the dot and one of the four
possible TLDs to the generated strings yielding the final AGDs.2
As illustrated in the confusion matrix of M-ResNet.MI (Fig.2), a
huge fraction of the AGDs belonging to Bedep, Dircrypt, Goznym,
and Hesperbot are falsely labeled as Ramnit. The latter three DGAs
are generally very poorly detected by M-ResNet.MI yielding nearly
clear white diagonal cells in the confusion matrix. Considering that
a huge fraction of the AGDs generated by these three DGAs match
the same regular expression, this is not surprising. Although, class
weighting with γ = 0.3 is utilized the classification is still biased
towards the better represented classes, in this case towards Ramnit.
By investigating which specific samples of this group of DGAs
are falsely labeled we can draw conclusions on the possible features
used for classification. For instance, within the samples of Bedep
which are misclassified by M-ResNet.MI as Ramnit, there are no
samples which contain numbers or the character “z”. Consequently,
we reckon that the set of characters included within AGDs is used
as features to separate different DGA families in M-ResNet.MI. In
comparison, M-Endgame.MI does also not classify any samples
of Bedep which include numbers as Ramnit but incorrectly labels
samples which include the character “z”. The corresponding set of
falsely labeled samples of M-NYU.MI contains both, samples with
numbers and samples with “z”.
We also reckon that the AGD length is used as a feature for clas-
sification. Investigating the samples of Goznym which are classified
as Ramnit reveals that M-ResNet.MI and M-Endgame.MI do not
wrongly classify any samples shorter than 8 characters or contain-
ing the character “z”. Similarly, M-NYU.MI does not label Goznym’s
samples shorter than 8 characters as Ramnit but fails to separate
AGDs of those classes based on the character “z”. The separation
based solely on the length of AGDs is observable on the samples
287.8% of all Ramit’s AGDs in DGArchive end with the .com TLD
Table 6: Complex Feature Extraction Capability
Accuracy
FANCI B-Endgame B-NYU B-ResNet
0.50188 0.58441 0.51569 0.69904
generated by Feodo which are classified as Blackhole, since no sam-
ples of length 18 are mislabeled.
Lastly, we reckon that the TLD of AGDs is used to separate
different DGA families. Investigating the samples generated by
Oderoor which are labeled as Vidro reveals that no AGDs which use
the .cc or .tv TLD are misclassified.
6.1.1 Complex Feature Extraction Capability. So far we only iden-
tified features potentially learned by the deep learning classifiers to
discriminate between different DGA families which are also easily
recognizable by a human. In the following, we examine the capabil-
ity of the classifiers to extract more complex features. To this end,
we use implementations of reverse engineered DGAs from [3] to
generate a data set which incorporates samples of two DGAs which
are not distinguishable via their AGD regular expression. Specifi-
cally, we use the DNSchanger DGA which generates domain names
that match [a-z]{10}.com, and adjusted the DGA Dircrypt such that
the AGDs it generates match the same regular expression by fixing
the length of the strings it generates to 10 (see Table 5). Thereby,
we create a data set composed of 350,000 unique samples per class.
We then perform 5 repetitions of a 5-fold cross validation to assess
the performance of the different binary classification models.
Table 6 shows the averaged results for the different classifiers. It
is not surprising that FANCI fails to separate the two classes (ACC of
50.188%) considering that its features are engineered to discriminate
between benign andmalicious NXDs and not to distinguish different
DGAs. However, the performance of B-NYU (ACC of 51.569%) is
also close to random guessing. B-Endgame achieves an accuracy of
58.441%, but B-ResNet outperforms all other approaches with an
accuracy of 69.904%. B-ResNet is thus able to label a huge fraction of
samples based on the used generation algorithm with a probability
significantly higher than random guessing.
This experiment indicates that B-ResNet is better suited to ex-
tract complex features than any of the previously proposed classi-
fiers. We reckon that this is due to its architecture and choice of
hyperparameters.
6.2 Robustness
We assess the robustness of the different classifiers by measuring
their detection capabilities when presented with samples generated
by one of two evasion strategies. These have recently be shown
to be effective against FANCI and B-Endgame in the case where
these classifiers were trained using Alexa domains or resolving
DNS traffic as benign data.
Peck et al. propose Charbot[15], a DGA which randomly selects
a second level domain from the Alexa top domain names, replaces
two random characters and appends one of 22 TLDs in order to
generate an AGD. Spooren et al. iteratively developed the Deception
DGA[25] targeting FANCI by exploiting the handcrafted features
used for classification. Thereby, the authors crafted a DGA which
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Table 7: Robustness Analysis
Benign data: NX-traffic
Classifier TPR at FPR=0.01 TPR at FPR=0.001
charbot deception charbot deception
FANCI 0.98064 0.99994 0.94283 0.98919
B-Endgame 0.98644 0.99952 0.80812 0.80575
B-NYU 0.99017 0.99987 0.94053 0.95185
B-Resnet 0.98793 0.99958 0.92144 0.93696
Peck et al.[15], benign data: resolving DNS traffic / Alexa data
FANCI 0.2143 / 0.0305 0.4685 / 0.0166 - / - - / -
B-Endgame 0.3190 / 0.1550 0.3773 / 0.1274 0.1525 / 0.0558 0.1661 / 0.0402
specifically aims to fool FANCI but is at the same time difficult to
detect by deep learning based approaches.
For this evaluation, we obtain 150,000 samples of the Deception
DGA from DGArchive and generate the same amount of samples
using the Charbot algorithm. Since the Deception samples do not
contain any TLDs, we randomly append one of the TLDs used by
Charbot to each sample. For both DGAs, we create one individual
data set by including 150,000 benign samples drawn uniformly at
random from the Oct./Nov. 2017 university data. We then use the
trained binary classifiers from the mixed DGA experiment (Sec-
tion 5.1.1) to evaluate the classifiers’ performances against the
adversarial examples.
Table 7 visualizes the averaged TPRs of 20 passes per classi-
fier and DGA at an FPR of 1% and 0.1%. Recall that in our setup
all classifiers are trained on real-world NXDs as benign samples.
In comparison, Table 7 also includes the TPRs of FANCI and B-
Endgame reported in [15], using resolving DNS traffic or Alexa
top domain names as source for benign samples. Our evaluation
shows that all classifiers are remarkably robust against both adver-
sarial attacks when NX-traffic is used as benign data for training.
At a fixed FPR of 1% the detection rates for Charbot (98%-99%) are
slightly lower compared to the TPRs for the Deception DGA, where
nearly all samples are labeled correctly. At a fixed FPR of 0.1% the
detection rates of B-Endgame are by far the worst. Interestingly,
FANCI achieves the highest TPRs for the Deception DGA although
the DGA was specifically created to evade detection by FANCI.
In comparison, the TPRs of B-Endgame and FANCI trained on
Alexa top domains or resolving traffic reported in [15] are signifi-
cantly lower. The authors of Charbot were not even able to establish
a classification threshold for FANCI achieving an FPR of 0.1%, prob-
ably due to FANCI’s features which focus on separating benign
and malicious NXDs. As could be expected, classifiers which are
trained on Alexa top domain names are easier to fool. Charbot uses
the Alexa list as basis for its AGD generation, whereas during the
iterative development of the Deception DGA the Alexa top domain
names served as benign samples for the targeted classifier. Similarly,
the huge differences between the performances of the classifiers
when training is performed on NX-traffic can be explained by the
fact that the domain names of the resolving DNS traffic, which
are used for training, are naturally more similar to the Alexa top
domain names that are used to create the adversarial examples.
While training on NXDs does not enhance robustness against
adversarial attacks in general, it increases the effort required to
generate adversarial AGDs as an attacker has to be in possession
Table 8: Generalization Experiments
Scenario ACC TPR TNR FNR FPR
Baseline: x 0.99916 0.99978 0.99853 0.00022 0.00147
B-ResNet, σ 0.00013 0.00014 0.00024 0.00014 0.00024
Mixed DGAs xmin 0.99852 0.99928 0.99739 0.00000 0.00102
(Section 5.1.1) x˜ 0.99917 0.99983 0.99855 0.00017 0.00145
xmax 0.99938 1.00000 0.99898 0.00072 0.00261
Network x 0.99761 0.99991 0.99531 0.00009 0.00469
Generalization: σ 0.00034 0.00005 0.00070 0.00005 0.00070
Train University, xmin 0.99693 0.99982 0.99386 0.00000 0.00354
Test Company x˜ 0.99770 0.99991 0.99544 0.00009 0.00456
xmax 0.99817 1.00000 0.99646 0.00018 0.00614
Network x 0.99869 0.99979 0.99759 0.00021 0.00241
Generalization: σ 0.00023 0.00011 0.00051 0.00011 0.00051
Train Company, xmin 0.99834 0.99955 0.99678 0.00004 0.00155
Test University x˜ 0.99865 0.99982 0.99761 0.00018 0.00239
xmax 0.99903 0.99996 0.99845 0.00045 0.00322
Time x 0.99887 0.99982 0.99793 0.00018 0.00207
Generalization, σ 0.00009 0.00014 0.00022 0.00014 0.00022
Difference: xmin 0.99867 0.99942 0.99737 0.00003 0.00175
1 Month x˜ 0.99887 0.99985 0.99798 0.00015 0.00202
xmax 0.99902 0.99997 0.99825 0.00058 0.00263
Time x 0.99777 0.99774 0.99779 0.00226 0.00221
Generalization, σ 0.00062 0.00106 0.00089 0.00106 0.00089
Difference: xmin 0.99634 0.99506 0.99477 0.00076 0.00172
17 Months x˜ 0.99784 0.99781 0.99807 0.00219 0.00193
xmax 0.99863 0.99924 0.99828 0.00494 0.00523
of appropriate NX-traffic from a sufficiently large network in order
to craft such a DGA.
6.3 Generalization
We evaluate how well B-ResNet generalizes to different networks
and thus in how far the classification can be outsourced as a service.
To this end, we train B-ResNet on data recorded in one network
and perform classification on samples observed in the other net-
work. Subsequently, we investigate whether frequent retraining is
necessary in order to adjust to possible changes within a network
over time. Here, we train the classifier on data which is available up
to a certain point in time and then evaluate its performance upon
prediction of samples which were recorded at a later point in time.
6.3.1 Network Generalization. We show that the classification per-
formance of B-ResNet is independent of the specific network it
was trained in. To this end, we perform experiments similar to the
ones described in Section 5.1.1 in which we detect arbitrary AGDs
of known DGAs. For the sake of clarity in the tables, we omitted
statistical values except for the averages x when comparing the
classifiers. In order to be able to analyze the generalizability of
B-ResNet in detail, we here additionally provide the standard de-
viation σ , the minimum xmin and maximum xmax values of the
scores, and the median x˜ for B-ResNet in the upper part of Table 8.
We create 20 data sets for each of the two benign data sources,
the university and the company network. Each of these 40 sets
includes 1,000 randomly picked samples of each DGA in DGArchive
for which that many AGDs are known and as many samples as
possible if less than 1,000 AGDs are available. As benign data, each
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of the sets contains as many randomly chosen samples from the
respective benign data source as malicious samples are included.
The benign samples were recorded approximately at the same point
in time in both networks, more precisely Oct./Nov. 2017. For each
of the 40 sets, we train a classifier and perform classification on
all 20 sets which include benign samples of the respective other
network. Thus, we perform 20 ·20 = 400 evaluations for training on
university data and testing on company data and 400 evaluations
for the other direction.
The middle part of Table 8 shows the averaged results for the
network generalization experiment. When training on university
data and predicting on company data, the ACC slightly decreases
and the standard deviation increases for every metric except for the
TPR and the FNR compared to the baseline results. The increase
of the FPR is an expected outcome since benign samples of one
network may miss specific properties of samples from the other
network. The best ACC is achieved at an FNR of 0.00009 which is
less than half of the baseline’s FNR. Therefore, it might be possible
to decrease the FPR bymoving the decision threshold at the expanse
of the FNR and ACC.
For the other direction (training on company data and testing
on university data), the ACC again decreases slightly compared to
the baseline. However, this time the FNR stays in the same order of
magnitude and the increase of the FPR is smaller.
Both of the experiments show that B-ResNet is able to generalize
very well to unknown networks.
6.3.2 Time Generalization. We analyze whether it is advisable to
frequently retrain B-ResNet. We perform two evaluations in which
we train the classifiers using only DGArchive and company data
that was recorded up to a specific point in time. Hence, only AGDs
of DGAs which were present in DGArchive at that time are included
in the training sets. First, we train the classifier on data which was
available up to Mar. 2019 and evaluate on data which was recorded
in Apr. 2019. Thereby, we have at least a one-month time difference
between the training and testing samples. Then, we repeat this
experiment with a time difference of 17 months (train on data
available up to Nov. 2019 and evaluate on Apr. 2019 data). Similarly
to the network generalization experiments, we create 20 sets per
time interval yielding 400 evaluation passes per time difference.
The lower part of Table 8 depicts the results of the time general-
ization experiment. The results for a time distance of one month
are very similar to the ones of the baseline. The FPR is slightly
higher which could be due to changes in the benign data caused
by changes within the company’s network. The FNR stays in the
same order of magnitude. Since the ACC is nearly as high as for the
baseline and the standard deviation is small, it seems unnecessary
to retrain the classifier after one month.
The results for the prediction on data using a classifier which
was trained on samples recorded 17 months ago show an increased
standard deviation of the FPR compared to the previous experi-
ment. Again, this might be caused by changes within the network.
Moreover, the FNR increases by more than a factor of 10 compared
to the baseline. The reason for this is that the 4 DGAs: Ccleaner,
Nymaim2, Tinynuke, and Wd are not included in the training sets
but in the testing sets. The averaged TPR for these DGAs is 0.96790
while the TPR forWd is the worst with 0.89690. However, the AGDs
Table 9: Performance Analysis
Classifier T r aininд T ime
Classi f ier
[s ] Classi f icat ion T ime
Sampl e
[µs ]
B-Endgame 103.8 82.6
B-NYU 33.0 22.5
B-ResNet 36.5 32.6
M-Endgame 1310.3 70.9
M-Endgame.MI 1268.8 66.6
M-NYU 446.1 17.3
M-NYU.MI 410.4 17.5
M-ResNet 871.6 73.1
M-ResNet.MI 886.6 72.3
generated by Ccleaner and Tinynuke can be detected with a TPR
of 1.00000 and 0.99998, respectively. Therefore, while retraining
is not required for a high detection rate for some DGAs such as
Ccleaner and Tinynuke, the TPR for other DGAs such as Wd can be
significantly increased by including samples of it into the training
set. Excluding these four DGAs from the TPR calculation results in
an overall score of 0.99981 with a standard deviation of 0.00010.
These results show that B-ResNet is remarkably time-robust and
able to detect AGDs of known DGAs independent of the generation
date of the AGD. Thus, retraining B-ResNet may be useful when
new DGAs are detected in order to decrease the FNR. To achieve
the smallest possible FPR, we recommend retraining the classifier
as frequently as possible.
6.4 Training & Classification Speed
Here, we compare the training and classification speed of the fea-
tureless classifiers. We intentionally exclude FANCI from this com-
parison as all other approaches are evaluated on a GPUwhile FANCI
is executed on the CPU. For the comparison, we measure the train-
ing and classification time in the binary mixed DGAs experiment
(Section 5.1.1) and in the multiclass experiment (Section 5.2).
Table 9 depicts the averaged time to train one classifier and the
classification times per sample over all passes for both experiments
and each of the deep learning classifier. For the binary classification
task, the B-Endgame classifier requires the most time for training
as well as classification. B-NYU and B-ResNet are similar with
respect to training times but the NYU model needs 10.1 µs less
time to classify a single sample. In the multiclass scenario, the NYU
classifiers are the fastest to train. The ResNet classifiers require
approximately twice the training time of the NYU models and the
Endgame classifiers need thrice as much time. For classification,
the NYU models need by far the least time. The Endgame and the
ResNet-based models classify samples at a similar speed.
Note that the ResNet-based approaches are fast enough to per-
form live detection in large networks. Within the network of the
company, there are on average 148 NXD responses per second with
a maximum peak of 2471 NXDs per second. B-ResNet classifies
a single sample in 32.6µs and therefore is able to classify 30,674
samples per second. M-ResNet.MI needs 72.3µs for a single domain
name and therefore classifies 13,831 samples per second. Hence, the
ResNet-based approaches are real-time capable and can perform
live detection in large networks for both classification tasks.
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Figure 3: Real world samples of unknown AGDs.
7 REAL WORLD
To test B-ResNet’s real-world applicability, we reuse the 20 classi-
fiers of the time generalization experiment (Section 6.3.2). Recall
that these are trained on a subset of the Feb. 2019 company data and
DGArchive data up to March 2019. Each classifier is used to classify
the whole unfiltered recording of Apr. 2019 in the company network.
The results are then averaged. In total, the recording comprises
over 370 million NXD responses, 27 million of which are unique.
On average, the classifiers labeled 69,138 unique samples as
malicious. Filtering the whole recording against DGArchive, we
observe 13,870 unique AGDs which are generated by 6 different
known DGAs. This is what a traditional blacklist would detect.
Notably, 17 of the 20 classifiers are able to detect all known AGDs
and the average TPR is 99.997%. Through a semiautomatic exami-
nation of the remaining positives we try to reveal unknown AGDs.
Note that “unknown” in this context means that the AGDs are not
included in DGArchive and could not be found in other common
OSINT sources, such as VirusTotal, at the time of writing. To find
groups within unknown AGDs we cluster them by their length,
included characters, TLDs, number of queries, time span (from the
first occurrence to the last one), Shannon entropy, and number of
included English words. We label the groups, either as unknown
DGAs or as unknown seeds of a known DGA, with the help of
DGArchive, domain knowledge, and manual research.
With this technique we are able to report 5,833 unknown AGDs,
which are represented by 8 clusters of which we reckon 6 to be
unknown DGAs, 1 an unknown seed of Bamital, and 1 to be the
Conficker DGA. A further examination of the found Conficker AGDs
revealed, that these domains are generated several months ahead
of their validity period, explaining why these samples were not
included in DGArchive. Possible explanations for this could be that
the re-implementation which is used to create the blacklist for this
DGA is faulty, the infected hosts have incorrect time settings, or
this could be a new Conficker DGA variant which intentionally
generates AGDs ahead of its original validity period in order to
circumvent simple blacklisting approaches. Fig. 3 shows represen-
tatives of unknown AGDs for each of the remaining groups.
Concluding, within this one-month time period we reckon 49,435
unique samples to be false positives, which corresponds to an FPR
of 0.00182 and approximately 69 false positives per hour for a large
international company. Note that there is a one-month time differ-
ence between training the classifiers and performing the prediction.
As indicated in the time generalization experiment (Section 6.3.2),
a more recently trained classifier would achieve an even lower FPR.
In practice, the intrusion detection system which incorporates DGA
detection should only fire an alert if for a host the number of posi-
tively marked samples exceeds a configurable threshold. Thereby,
the false alarm rate can be reduced significantly. This real-world
application test shows the practicability of B-ResNet.
8 CONCLUSION
Bringing DGA detection closer to practice, we proposed ResNet-
based classifiers for the DGA binary and multiclass classification
task and compared their performance to various state-of-the-art
classifiers in a unified setting using the same real-world NX-traffic.
B-ResNet achieves accuracies comparable to the other classifiers
while it exceeds them in the extraction of complex features. Our
M-ResNet.MI model outperforms the other classifiers while it re-
duces the required training time by over 30% compared to the next
best classifier. We demonstrated that B-ResNet is remarkably time-
robust and generalizes well to new environments, which allows for
the provisioning of classification as a service. B-ResNet, as well asM-
ResNet.MI, are able to perform live detection in large networks and
are able to detect both, new DGAs as well as new seeds of known
DGAs. In particular, in our one-month real-world application test
we could discover 8 new DGA-related groups of AGDs, 6 of which
appear to originate from yet unknown DGAs. In our explainabil-
ity analysis, we highlighted some of the self-learned features used
by the deep learning based approaches. The classifiers are robust
against two recently published adversarial attacks when trained on
NX-traffic ([15, 25]). This unfolds yet another advantage of using
NX-traffic as training data. In future work, we plan to investigate
the effectiveness of more complex attacks (e.g.[1, 22]) as well.
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